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[S, F. XOR. ::!0302, 20311. In Bank. July 1, 1060.] 
RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATIO~ (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. ITBLIC rTILITIES CO~DIISSW~ OF 
TIlE STATE OF CALIFOl{KL\, ReSp01H1L'llt; SOFl'Il-
ERN COUNTIES G"\S CO)IPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
(a Corporation), Real Party in Interest. 
[Two Cases.] 
[So F. Nos. 20303, 20313. In Bank. July 1, 1060.] 
S01JTIlERN CALIFOR~IA EDISON COMPANY (a Cor-
poration), Petition!.'r, V. PFBT.JIC eTILITIES COM-
MISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNL\, Re-
spondent; SOUTHERN C01JNTIES GAS COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Real Party in In-
terest. 
[Two Cases.] 
[1] Public Utilities-Dedication to Public Use.-Although the re-
quirement of the Public Utilities Act of service or delivery of 
any commodity "to the public or any portion thereof" suggests 
dedication, the definition of those word" as including "a per-
son" or "private corporation" suggests the contrary, and the 
language that is codified in Pub. Uti!. Code, § 216, subd. (c), 
does not require that the initial performance of service or de-
livery of a commodity be made "to the public or auy portion 
thereof." 
[2] ld.-Dedication to Public Use.-It may be assumed that ini-
tially dedication as a prerequisite to public utility regulation 
was imposed as a li:nitation on the broad lan;;uage of the Public 
Utilities Act solely to meet con"titutional objections that arc 
no longer valid. However, in view of the history of the act 
and the substantial reiinnce on its consistent interpretatioll 
and application by the Supreme Comt and the Public Utilities 
Commission (or its predecessor) for more than 40 years, it 
must be cOllclmh'd that the Legi~lature by its repeated reen-
actment of the definition" of public utilities without change 
has accepted nnd adopteJ dedicntion as un implicit limitation 
on their terms. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Puhlic Utilities and Services, § 2 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-·1] Public Utilities, § 6; [5,9, 10, 12-
17] Gas, § 1; [6,7] Oil, § 3; [S, 11] Public Utilities, § 4. 
) 
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[3] Id.-Dedication to Public Use.-The conclusion that the statu-
tory Jdinitiolls of public utilities apply only to utilities that 
have dedicated their property to public use does not render 
the broad language of Pub. Util. Code, §~ :207, 216, subd. (c), 
superlluous; those provisions make clear that a utility that ha;; 
dcdicated its property to public use is a public utility thoug-h 
it llIay serve only one or a few customers or a utility that in 
turn serves the public. 
[4] Id.-Dedication to Public Use.-Pub. Util. Code, ~ 216, subd. 
(c), allays any doubt that a public utility that has been serving 
the public directly remains such though it turns its distribut-
ing system over to a publicly or privately owned utility and 
thereafter limits its own business to supplying the utility that 
directly serves the public. 
[5] Gas-Regulation.-In the oil and gas industry, abandonment 
of the requirement of dedication as a prerequisite to regulation 
would subject every oil and gas producer that has sold or 
proposes to sell gas for light, heat or power or for resale to the 
public to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. 
To impose such regulation on the oil and gas industry by a new 
construction of the Public Utilities Act would create manifold 
problems; only the Legislature can properly determine whether 
such or some other form of regulation should be imposed to 
promote the public interest. 
[6] Oil-Regulation.-Although a corporation may operate part 
of its business as a public utility and part in a purely private 
capacity, the administrative difficulties of effective regUlation 
when the two parts are so closely interrelated as the produc-
tion of oil and gas are apparent. 'Where as a producer's un-
equivocal dedication of part of its property to It public use 
affords a basis for segregating its regulated from its unrcgu-
lnted activity, if the settled standard of dedication were to be 
nbandoned, some other method would have to be developed 
for segregating oil and gas operations for purposes of regu-
lation. 
[7] Id.-Regulation.-It is not unreasonable to assume that the 
requirement of dedication haS' been of ~ome value in obviating 
regulation of many small oil and gas producers whose activities 
fall within the literal definitions of the Public Utilities AC't, 
but are too restricted to merit public concern. Although it 
Illay be true that this requirement has also permitted lar;!"!' 
producers to escape regulation, existing law provides no al-
ternative to dedication for s,electing those to be regulated; 
abolition of one standard to determine who should be regulated 
would compel choice of another. 
(;'i] See Cal.Jur.2d, Gas Companies, § 5; Am.Jur., G ns and Oil, 
* 140 et seq. 
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[8] Public Utilities-Corporations Subject to Control.-A foreign 
corporation rnunot r"<'apr puhlie utilit~· regulation or ('Y:1or 
public utility ohlig-ations on th(' ;.:-round that its adiviti('s nl"P 
illegal. 
[9] Gas-Regulation.-Jf puhlie utility regulntion were (,,,tende.l 
to all oil and gas prooncers who fall within the literal language 
of the Public Utilities Act .. producers who used their gas them-
selves or sold it to otlwrs to manufacture into chemical pro-
ducts or to use for other purposes not specified in thc act 
would escape regulation. Regulation dependent on how the 
producer disposes of his gas might stimulate less desirable 
unregulated uses at the expense of more desirable regulated 
uses. 
[10] Id.-Regulation.-The producer's freedom under existing law 
to determine how his gas shall be disposed of so long as he does 
not dedicate his property to public use has not resulted in 
sufficient misuse of gas or sufficiently wasteful marketing prac-
tices to induce the Legislature to change it. The Legislature 
can best determine whether there should be further regulation 
of the oil and gas industry and, if so, th(' form it should take. 
[11] Public Utilities-Corporations Subject to Control.-Pub. nil. 
Code, § 1001, relating to corporations requiring certifieat('s of 
public convenience, npplies only to public utilities. 
[12] Gas-Regulation.-Had the L('gislature wished to regulate 
competition between public utility and nonpublic utility gas 
corporations by requiring certificates of public conwnience 
and necessity, it is reasonable to as;;ume that it would have 
done so by requiring nonpublic utility gas corporations to 
secure certificates to provide service, not merely to build 
plants or extension thereof. Regulation of plant construction 
and extension is a meaningful adjunct to onrall utility regu-
lation, but as applied to otherwise unregulated utility gas 
corporations it would serve haphazardly at best to protect 
public utility gas corporations from undesirable competitioll. 
[13] Id.-Regulation.-Although an oil and gas producer cou].l 
not withdraw property from a use to which it had been dedi-
cated without the Public Utility Commission's consent or 
escape regulation by converting all or part of a public utility 
service into a nonpublic utility service, it remains free to use 
property it has not dedicated to public use llS it sees fit so 
long as it does not dedicate such property or prejudice any 
public utility obligations it may have assumed. 
[14] Id.-Regulation.-In a proceeding attacking orders of t.·e 
Public Utilities Commission that an oil and gas producer ,.as 
a public utility gas corporation subject to the jurisdictil.1l of 
the commission and ordering it to cease and desist from dl liver-
ing gas to a public utility electrical corporation, resllution 
of conflicting inferences that might be dra \\'n fr01ll tl'S .iIllOIlY 
) 
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(Ii I.hc prutluccl":; yicc-prc:;itlcllt with rcgard tu dedication of 
gllS rCSl'rVeH for peaking' purposcs was for the commission. 
[15] Id.-Regulation.-An oil lind gas pl'odueer did not dedicate 
it;; glls rcserves by ag'l'CClllent to sell gas to a public utility 
electrical corporation, where such sale was made to a selected 
customer und like service was denied to others. 
[16] Id.-Regulation.-A corporation that owns property for the 
"transmission ... of gas" (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 221) as a com-
mon carrier may be a gas corporation within the meaning of 
Pub. Uti!. Code, §§ 221, 222, though it was once also defined 
as a pipeline corporation or is arguably so defined on the 
theory that gas is a "lluid" substance within the meaning of 
§ 227. Despite .the differences between the obligations imposed 
by the cOIDmon-carrier condition of the federal act (30 U.S.C. 
§ 185) and those imposed on public utilities by the California 
act, the holding out to serve the public implicit in common 
carriage is at least substantial evidence that would support a 
finding that a federal permittee had dedicated its pipeline to 
public use for the COllllllon carriage of gas. 
[17] Id.-Regulation.-The Public Utilities Act is not concerned 
with an oil and gas producer's purely nonpublic utility activ-
ities, and its certification provisions may not be invoked to 
prohibit the construction and use of facilities for non public 
utility activitics merely because the producer may in the in-
definite future wish or be called on to make such facilities 
available for public use. When and if the producer wishes or 
is called on to make its pipeline available for common carriage 
of gas, it may then be determined whether its private use must 
be curtailed to avoid conflict with any obligation to the public 
it assumed in accepting II federal permit subject to the C01l\-
mon-cnrrier condition. 
PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Public Utilities 
Commission determining that an oil and gas producer, in 
respect to its gas operations, was a public utility gas corpora-
tion subject to jurisdiction of the commission, and ordering it 
to cease and desist from delivering gas to a steam-electric 
generating plant. Orders annulled. 
Mervyn \V. Phelan, Ball, Hunt & Hart, Joseph A. Ball, 
Clark Heggcness, Rollin E. 'Woodbury, Harry \V. Sturges, .Jr .. 
Trippet, Yoakum & Ballantyne, Oscar A. Trippet and 'fhomas 
II. Carver for Petitioners. 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Turner H. McBaine, 0 'Ml·I-
vcny & Myers, Pierce \Vorks, Richard C. Bergen, \Villiam \Y. 
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Prank n. Belcher, l\1I'Cutl'hrn, Doyll', Browll & Enersell, 
'William H. Gardner, Stanl",\" & Kirby, and Charl('s C. Stanley 
as Amici Curiae on b('half of Petitioncrs. 
'William l'1. B(,lln('tt, Chi('f Couns('l, Roderick B. Cassidy, 
..Assistant Chief Couns!'!, l'lary :\loran Pajalich, Senior Coun-
sel and J. Calvin Simpson, .:\,,;;is\aut Counsel, for Rcspond('ut. 
Reginald L. Vaughan, \Yiiliam P. Gray, Joseph R. Renseh, 
Milford Springer and Herman P. Selvin for Real Party in 
lntl'rest. 
Dion R. Holm, City .Attorn('y (San Fran('isco), Orville I. 
\Yright, Drputy City Attol'llry, Rog('r Arn('hrrgh, City At-
torney (Los Angeles), Alan G. Campbell, Assistant City At-
torney, Jean F. DuPaul, Cit~- Attorney (San Diego), Fred-
erick B. Holoboff, Deputy City Attorney, John K. Colwell, 
City Attorney (Santa Ana), Thomas W. Bewley, City At-
torney (\Yhittier), Charl('s A. Rummel, General Counsel, 
California Farm Bureau Federation, William L. Knecht, 
Chickering & Gregory, Sherman Chickering, C. Rayd(,ll 
Ames, Robert \Y. Tallman and George A. Malloch as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Responcl,:'nt and R~al Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, .J.-In these proeeedings Richfield Oil Corpora-
tion, an oil and gas producer, and Southern California Edison i 
Company, a public utility electrical corporation, attack two 
orders of the Public Utilities Commission determining that in 
respect to its gas operations Richfield is a public utility gas 
corporation subjed to the jurisdiction of the commission and 
ordering it to cease and desist from delivering gas to Edison's 
Ma1ldalay steam-electric generating plant. 
This controversy arose out of Edison's wish to obtain and 
Hiehfield's willingness to deliver a dependable supply of 
natural gas to be used as boiler fuel for a new steam-electric 
generating plant at Edison's Mandalay station in Ventura 
County. That plant is loeated in the certificated service area 
of Southern Connties Gas Company, a regulated public utility 
gas corporation. Southern Counties objects to the invasion of 
its service area by Ril!hfield. Edison contends, however, that 
Southern Counties is unwilling or unahle to provide the gas 
service Edison requires and that therefore it is compelled to 
seek gas elsewhere. It points out that Southern Counties 
offers it only an interruptible gas snpply subject to being shut 
off when the gas is required fOl' Southern Counties' firm or 
non interruptible customers and that Southern Counties will 
) 
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not commit itself to deliver a fixed volume of gas per year. It 
asserts that use of fuel oil as an alternative fuel when gas is 
unavailable is objectionable because of air pollution, and that 
unless it can count on a given total supply of gas, whether 
supplied with or without interruption, it cannot arrange for 
an economical supply of fuel oil to complete its fuel require-
ments. 
Richfield is willing to supply Edison with gas for its Manda-
lay plant pursuant to a contract it entered into with Edison, 
but it is not willing to do so as a regulated public utility gas 
corporation and has therefore refused to apply for a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity to provide such service 
and would not accept such a certificate if it were offered to it. 
Southern Counties and the commission contend that Rich-
field's delivery of gas to Edison is subject to the commission's 
jurisdiction and that since Richfield has refused to seek per-
mission to perform that service pursuant to lawful regulation, 
the cease and desist order was proper. They contend that to 
permit a major producer of natural gas to commit a significant 
fraction of the state's gas reserves to a major consumer without 
regulation will defeat the public interest. They point out that 
a public utility gas corporation must secure sufficient gas and 
build adequate facilities to supply all of its firm customers, 
predominantly householders, with all of the gas they need on 
the coldest days. To operate economically such a system must 
have interruptible customers, such as industrial plants and 
power plants, that can use gas for fuel when it is not needed 
by the firm customers, but who can switch to oil when it is. 
If interruptible customers are permitted to secure firm sup-
plies of gas through unregulated contracts made directly with 
producers, the balance between firm and interruptible cus-
tomers of regulated utilities may be destroyed. Moreover, 
since there is not enough gas to supply all of the needs of all 
of the consumers who wish to use it, it is contended that the 
public interest requires that the commission determine how 
the supply shall be allocated. . 
There is no need to expand the persuasive arguments of 
Southern Counties and the commission that the Legislature 
could constitutionally provide for the regulation of Richfield's 
service to Edison. It may be assumed that the public interest 
in such an important natural .resource as natural gas would 
justify under the United States Constitution comprehensive 
legislation regulating all phases of its production and use. 
The~e questions do not aril>e, however, unless the commission 
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has been vested by the California COIl;;tit lit ion and lcgislation 
pursuant thel'l'to with the jllrisdidioil OWl' Hiehfield that it 
asserts,l 
Richfield eOll t cllds tha t the COlllln issioll has no .i llrisdiction 
to regulate it as a public utility gas corporation 011 the ground 
that it has not deJieatl'd its property to a public use. It relil'" 
upon an unbroken lint' of decisions from Thayer v. California 
Del'clopmellt Co. (1912),164 Cal. 117 [128 P. 21], to Calitv/'-
m~a Water d'; Tel. Co. v. P/(blic Util. Com. (1959), 51 Ca1.2d 
478 [334 P.2d 887], reCJ.uirillg' dedication as a prerequisite to 
public utility regulation, and it contends that the requirement 
of dedication is implicit in the constitutional and statutory 
definitions of public utilit ies as utilities that render services 
"to or for the public" (Cal. Const., art. XII, § 23) or "to the 
public 01' an~' portion tl:ereof." (Pub. Ptii. Cod(', § 216, subd. 
a; see also Associated etc. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 176 Cal. 
518, 522-523 [162 P. 62. L.R.A. 1918C 849] ; Souza v. Public 
Utilities Com., 37 Cal.2c1 539, 542-543 [233 P,2d 537].) 
Southern Count ips contends that dedication of property to a 
public use is different from service "to or for the public" or 
"to the public or any portion thereof," and that the require-
ment of dedication was engrafted onto the statutory provisions 
by the court to meet constitutional objections under the duE' 
process clause of the United States Constitution. Since in its 
view these constitutional objections did not survive the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in N ebbia v. New 
York, 291 U.S. 502 [54 S.Ot. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 
1469] (see also Phillips PcirolCll1ll Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 
672, 677 [74 S.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035]; Federal Power 
Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipcl!'ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 [62 
8.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037] ), it contends that the courts should 
reinterpret the relevant statutes and give effect to the plain 
meaning of their terms to the extent constitutionally permis-
sible today. (Cr Carl F. W. BOl'gwarcl, G.lrf.B.H. v. Superior 
Court, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [330 P.2d 789] ; Henry R. Jahn &- Son 
v. Superior Court, 49 Ca1.2d 855,858-859 [323 P.2d 437].) 
Suhdivision (a) of section 216 2 of the Public Utilities Code 
tIt is not contended that the commission's orders were or could have 
been based on the commission's power to regulnte Edison. (See Pacifio 
Tel. 4- Tel. Co. v. Public U tilitics Co-m., 3! Cal.2d 822, 828-830 [215 P.2d 
441] .) 
II I § 216. (a) I Public utility' includes every common carrier, toll 
bridge corporation, pipeline corporation, gas corporation, electric cor· 
poration, telephone corporation. telegmph corporation. wntt'r corporation, 
wharfinger, warehOll"'·lIliln, alll\ hl'at corl'ol':ltion, wht're tile service is 
) 
provilles: " 'Puhlie utility' indudes ever)" ... gas corpora-
lion ... whcre the s('l"Yil'l' i" pcrforlllcd for or the coltllllodity 
,1clivcrcu to the plt!>li',: Ot' allY portion t11('reof." Subdivision 
(b) proyidcs: ,. \Yhcn('vcr any , , , gas corporation, , , per-
forms a scn'icc or dl'livcl's a cOllllllodity to the public or any 
portion thct'cof for whirh any compcnsation Ot' paYlllcnt what-
soe\'er is rce(:iyC'tl, SUt'll , , , gas corporation, . , is a public 
utility subject to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of 
the cOlllmission and the provisions of this part." Subdivision 
(c) providcs: ",Vhen any perSOll or corporation performs any 
s('rvicc or deliYl'l'S any COllllllOdity to any pcrson, private cor-
poration, municipality or other political subdivision of the 
State, which in tmn either directly or inllircctly, mediately or 
immediately, performs such service or delivers such commodity 
to or for the public or some portion thereof, such person or 
eorporation is a public utility subjeet to the jurisdiction, cou-
trol, and regulation of the commission and the provisions of 
this part." Section ~22 provides: " 'Gas <'ol'poration' includes 
every corporation or person owning, controlling, operating, or 
managing any gas plant for eompcnsation within this State, 
except where gas is made or produced on and distributed by 
the maker or producer through priYate property alone solely 
for his own use or for the use of his tenants and not for sale to 
others." Scction 221 proyides: " 'Gas plant' includes all real 
estate, fixtures, and pcrsonal propert;\', owned, controlled, op-
erated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the pro-
duction, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of 
gas, natural or manufactured, for light, heat, or power." Sec-
performed for or the commodity delivered to the puLlie or any portion 
thereof, 
"(b) Whenever any common ~arrjer, toll bridge corporation, pipeline 
corporation, gns corporation, C'lectrical corporntion, tC'lephone corporation, 
telegraph corporation, water corporation, wharfinger, warehouseman, or 
heat corporntion performs n sen'ice or delivers a commodity to the 
public or any portion thereof for which any compensation or payment 
whatsoever is recei"ed, such common rarrier, toll Lridge corporation, 
pipeline corporntion, gas corporntion, electrical corporation, telephone 
corporation, telegrnph corporation, water corporation, wharfinger, ware-
houseman, or heat corporntion, is n public utility slIhject to the juris-
diction. control, and r('g1l1ation of the commission alld the provisions of 
tllis part. 
"(c) \Vhen any person or corporntion prl'forms ally sCf\'ice or delivers 
any commorlity to :my pereon, prh'ntc co!'poration, mnnieipality or other 
political suhdi,'ision of the State, which in turn either directly or 
indirectly, m(',lintply or immerliately, performs sll~h ~crdrp. or nclivcl's 
such commorlity to or for the ])nhlie or somc portion tllcreof, snch person 
or corporation is a pnblic utility suhject to the jnristlietion, control, and 
regulation of the commission and the pro\'isions of this part." 
) 
) 
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tiOll 207 pl'ovi(i('s: " 'Public or any pori ion t}\('reo£' means the 
public generally, or any limitE'd portion of the public, includ-
ing a person, private corporation, munil"ipality, or other politi-
cal subdivision of the State, for which thE' servi~e is perfonued 
or to which the commodity is dcliyerell." 
Scdions 207 and 216 or the Public Utilities Code were 
enacted in 1913 in substantially their present form (Stat8. 
1913, ch. 553, pp. 934, 938) as amendmcnts to section 2 of the 
Public Utilities Act of 1911 (Stats. ex. sess. 1911, ch. 14, p. 18) 
following the dec-ision in 1912 of Thavcr Y. Califol'1lia DeL'rlop-
rnent Co., 164 Cal. 117 l]:28 P. 21]. In that case the comt held 
that a melllber of the public could not demand service from a 
distributor of water if the distributor had not dedicated its 
water rights to public use, Although sed ion 1 of art ide XIV 
of the COllst itution provide(l that" The use of all water JlOW 
appropriateu, or that may herE'after be appropriated for sale, 
rental or distribution, is hereby declared to be a public use, 
and subject to the regulation and control of the state, in the 
manner to be prescribed by law," the court rejected the conten-
tion that this provision "necessarily creates a public use 
whenever any water is sold or distributed, regardless of the 
number of persons to whom it is delivered, the manner or 
character of the disposition made of it, or of the transfer of 
the right thereto." (164 Cal. at p. 133.) It pointed out that 
"In .Men'ill v. Southside Irr. Co., 112 Cal. 426 [44 P. 720], it 
was held that the word' appropriation,' in section 1 aforesaid, 
does not refer to the act by which the water is acquired, as the 
taking from the stream, for example, but to the act or acts by 
which it is designated, set apart, and devoted to the purposes 
of sale, rental, or distribution. According to the theory of the 
plaintiff in this case, whenever the owner of a water suppl.\· 
determines to and does sell it for a price agreed on betweC'1l 
himself and the purchasers, it immediately becomes subject to 
public use, and any other pcrson to whom it can be conveni-
ently distributed in the same manner would have the right to a 
proportionate share of the water on the same terms as the pur-
chaser, and, if the supply is limite<l, the first purchasers must 
divide with all others who may come in and claim a share. 
Under that theory, wl\{'?'e a person having a surplus of water 
parts with a portion of it hy sales to otlle1's he thereby appro-
priates sneh portion to purposes of sale and dedicates it to 
public 11se. This applic·ation of the sedion would destroy 
private rights in water and com'crt every sale thereof into It 
dedication to publie use. "Yc do not believe that the constitu-
42ii RTCR~'n;Ln Oil. ('OTU'. 1'. l'URT.IC UTIL. CoM. [54 C.2<1 
tion was intl.'JlIled to haw sneh cffcct, or that it should be so 
construed. Articlc XIV taken as a wbole shows plainly that it 
was intcnded to regulate the use of water appropriated and 
dedicated generally for sale and distribution among an indefi-
nite number of users. It could not have been intended to de-
clare that a single sale of a part of bis water by one having 
more than he needs would convert the use into a public use in 
which others could share. If a single sale could not do this, 
other sales of like character would not accomplish it. The sec-
tion must be understood to apply to cases where one has ap-
propriated water generally, for sale, rental, or distribution, 
and not to cases where sales are made to particular persons at 
a fixed price by ordinary contracts of purchase and sale." 
(164 Cal. at pp. 134-135.) 
If we were called upon to decide the question for the first 
time in the light of modern principles of constitutional law, 
we would have serious doubts that the broad language of the 
amendments to section 2 of the Public Utilities Act should be 
interpreted as including the limitation of dedication that the 
court found in the constitutional provision it construed in the 
Thayer case. [1] Although the requirement of service or 
delivery of any commodity "to the public or any portion 
thereof" suggests dedication, the definition of those words as 
including" a person" or "private corporation" suggests the 
contrary, and the language that is now codified in section 216, 
subdivision (c) does not require that the initial performance 
of service or delivery of a commodity be made "to the public 
or any portion thereof." It is also significant that in several 
early decisions the commission assumed jurisdiction over utili-
ties that fell within the literal definitions of the Public Utilities 
Act apparently without rcgard to whether or not they had 
dedicated their property to public use. (Application of San 
Fernando Mission Land Company (1914), 4 C.R.C. 384; 
Application of Traders Oil Company (1916), 9 C.R.C. 463; 
Application of Traders Oil Company (1917), 12 C.R.C. 647; 
Application of Mary IL Wohlford (1917), 12 C.R.C. 505; 
Calistoga Eleetric Company v. Napa Valley Electric Company 
(1917), 13 C.R.C. 280.) Contemporaneously with these deci-
sions, however, this court invoked the concept of dedication in 
several cascs in holding that a public utility could not be com-
pelled to deyotc its property to a use to which it had not bcen 
dedicated. (Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman (1913), 
166 Cal. 640,680 [137 P.1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822,50 L.R.A. 
XS. 652] ; Palmer (Otay Water League) v. Railroad Com-
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mission (1914), 167 Cal. 16:3, 174-17;) 11:38 P. !>!J71; [hi 
.1Iar lI"atO' etc. CO. Y. E,~hlcJ/lall (1914), 167 Cal. 666, GS3 
[140 P. 591, 948]; Alch(son elc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com .. 
(1916),173 Cal. 577, 585 [160 P. 828,2 A;L.H. 975] ; see also 
Marin Wafer etc. Co. v. Tou;n of Sausalito (1914), 168 Cal. 
587. 3!J;)-i)96 [143 P. 767] ; Palcrmo L. & W. Co. v. Railroad 
COli/mission (1916), 173 Cal. 380, 383 [160 P. 228]; Camp 
Rincon Resort Co. v. Esl!lclllall (1916), 172 Cal. 561, 564 
[158 P. 186].) . 
In 1917 in Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railt'oad Commissioll, 
176 Cal. 518 l169 P. 62, L.RA. 1918C 849], the court held that 
the Legislature eouIIl not declare that pipeline corporations 
were public utilities unless they hull dedicated their propcrty 
to puhlic usc (see also Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad COUl., 
176 Cal. 499,304 [169 P. 59]), and since that decision it has 
cOllsistClI tly interpreted the statutory definitions of public 
utilities as applying only to utilities that have dedicated their 
property to public use. ( .. 1llen v. Railroad Commission, 179 
Cal. 68, 89 [173 P. 466, 8 A.L.R 249] ; San Leandro v. Rail-
road Commission, 183 Cal. 229, 232 [191 P. I} ; Story v. RicIL-
ardson, 186 Cal. 162, 167 [198 P. 1057, 18 A.L.R 750] ; Rich-
ar'dsoll \T. Railroad Commission, 191 Cal. 716, 720 {218 P. 418] ; 
l([aft v. Rail7'oad Conw!'issioll, 192 Cal. 689, 702-703 [221 P. 
926] ; SOl/tltem Cal. Edison Co. v. RailroatZ Com., 194 Cal. 
757,763-764 [230 P. 661] ; Trask v. J1[oot'e, 24 Ca1.2d 365, 372-
373 [149 P.2d 834] ; Samllelson Y. Public Utilities Com., 36 
Ca1.2d 722, 732-733 [227 P.2d 256] ; Souza v. PulJZic Utilities 
Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 542-543 [233 P.2d 537] ; see also Com-
mercial Communications v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2d 512, 
523-524 [327 P.2d 513] ; Califonll~a Water «; Tel. Co. v. Pltb-
lie FtiT. Com., 51 Ca1.2d 478, 494 [334 P.2d 887] ; Pajal'o Valley 
Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utilities Oom., ante, pp. 256,261-263 
[5 Cal.Rptr. 313, 352 P.2d 721].) 
In 1919 the commission undertook an iuvestigation of the 
services rendered by certain public utility gas corporations 
and ordered that several oil companies who sold gas to the 
utilities be made parties to determine whether the oil com-
panies were also puhlie utilities. (Matter of Midway Gas Co., 
17 C.RC. 569, 571-572.) Thereafter, however, the oil com-
panies were apparently dropped from the case and no express 
decision as to their status appears. 111 its report to the Gover-
nor for the period from .July 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927, tlle 
eommif;sion directed attention to the prohlem of the waste of 
natul'U1 ~af; ill the oil aud gas pY'ot1ndion industry but pointed 
) 
) 
4:30 HlCHPIELD OIl, COlt!'. V. PUBl,1C e'rll,. CO~I. [M C.2d 
out that lleCl'ssary regulation was "outside of the jurisdiction 
of the Hailroad Commission." (P. 92.) In 1929 it refused to 
consider thc mcrits of a contrad fOI' tIle purchase of gas by a 
public utility g-ns corporation from a California pl'oducCI' 
(Matte?' of Southern Cali/orllia Gas Company, 33 C.R.C. 396, 
398), and in 1951 it statcd, "At this point we desire to observe 
that the price charged this utility by gas producers is 110t 
fixed by this Commission or other state authority. Thus, the 
utility buys ill an unregulatcd field and sells in a regulated 
field. Unlike several other states, this state does not, by law, 
fix the price of gas charged by producers. This is a matter 
which might well have the consideration of the legislatUl·e." 
(Pacific Gas &- Elccft'ic Co., 51 Cal. P.U.C. 130, 147.) III 1953 
it terminated and dismissed an iuvestigation into gas avail-
ability and service ill California, and i.a its decision stated, 
"The producers in California are not subject to rcgulation 
by the Commission and the utilities must depend upon con-
tracts or othcr arrangemcnts for obtaining the nccessary 
local supply of gas." (Decision No. 49127,52 Cal. P.U.C. 766, 
771.) It ordered its sccretary to mail copies of this decision to 
the Governor and members of the Legislature. (52 Cal. P.U.C. 
at p. 776.) (See also Gas Supply Company of Califonlia, 52 
Cal. P.F.C. 324, 325, 326; Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
53 Cal. P.D.C. 133, 134.) 
Since their enactment in substantially their present form 
in 1913, the Legislature has repeatedly rl'enacted the provisions 
of sections 207 and 216 ill amending, reenacting, and codifying 
the Public Utilities Act. (Stats. 1915, ch. 91, pp. 118-119; 
Stats.1917, ch. 77, pp. 1333-1334; Stats. 1919, ch. 304, p. 493; 
Stats. 1927, ch. 130, pp. 248-249; Stats. 1933, eh. 784, pp. 
2088-2089; Stats. 1937, eh. 896, p. 2478; Stats. 1951, eh. 764, 
pp. 2027, 2029.) 
[2] We may assume without deciding that initially dedi-
cation as a prerequisite to public utility regulation was im-
posed as a limitation on the broad language of the Publie 
Utilities Act solely to meet constitutional objections that are 
no longer valid. In view of the history of the act and the sub-
stantial reliance on its consistent intrrpretatiol1 and applica-
tion by this court and tIle comulissioll for more than 40 years, 
however, it must be l'oncluded that the Legislature by its re-
peated ret'nad1l1rnt oE tllc dt'finitiolls of puhlic utilities with-
ent eliange has acct'ptrd and a,loptl'd dl'dication as an implirit 
limitation 011 their terms. 
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sion render~ the broad lall~uage of section 207 and subdivision 
(c) of seetiOll 216 sup<'rftuou~. Those provisions make clear 
that a utilit~· that has ,ledicated its property to public use is 
a public utility even though it may serve only one or a few 
customers or a utility that ill turn serves the lJuulie. (See 
Commercial Communications v. Pllblic Util. Gom., 50 Cal.2d 
512, 523 [327 P.2d 513] ; Van Ilooscar v. Railroad Commi.s-
sion, 184 Cal. 633, 557 [194 P. 1003].) [4] Subdivision (c) 
of section 216 also alla~·s any doubt that a public utility that 
has been serving the public directly remains such even though 
it turns its distributing system over to a publicly or privately 
owned utility and thereafter limits its own business to supply-
ing the utility that directly serves the public. 
[ 5] We need not look beyond the oil and gas industry in 
this state to see what an abandonment of the requirement of 
dedication would entail. It would subject every oil and gas 
producer that has sold or proposes to sell gas for light, heat, 
or power or for resale to the public to the jurisdiction of the 
commission. That jurisdiction is extensive, and the commission 
is obligated to exercise it. (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 2101.) It in-
cludes jurisdiction oyer rates (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 728), ser-
vices (Pub. rtil. Code, § 761), construction of plants and ex-
tensions thercof (Pub. Util. Code, § 1001), issuance of securi-
ties (Pub. Util. Code, § 816), and the disposing or encumber-
ing of operativc property. (Pub. Util. Code, § 851.) The oil 
and gas produccrs in this state ha\'e not bcen subject to such 
jurisdiction when they have not dedicated their property to 
public use. Although we may assume that the oil and gas 
industry would have been successfully developed even if it 
had been fully regulated by the commission, it would 11('ces-
sarily be different in many respects from what it is. Such 
broad regulation as that provided by the Public Utilities Act 
could not help but have a substantial impact 011 the develop-
ment of any industry subject to it. To impose such reg-ula-
tion on the oil and gas industry as it exists today by a new 
construction of the act would create manifold problems. Onl.'" 
the L<'gislatnre can properly determine whrther or not such 
regulation or some other form of regulation should now be 
imposed to promote the public intercst. 
Oil and l!as are onlinarily produced together ft'om the same 
weils und fields, but the Public Utilities Act makes no pro-
vision for the regulation of oil corporations. [6] Althollgh 
a corporation llIay operate part of its Imsill<'ss as a pnbl i(~ 
utility and part ill a pmrly pI'ivatc t'apaeity (Calif O1'n irr 
Jlfl's. AsslI. V. /'1(1)111' Clifilie, CIIIII .• 4:2 Cal.:2,1 ;;;10, 5:)7 [:2(j,-; 
1',2/1 1J ; Lamb v. Caii/orllia H"all rd.' 1'1 I. Co., :U Cal.2d 3:1, 
40 [129 1'.2d 371J ; J/arill Iraler dc. Co. v. TOWI! of Sallsalito. 
]G8 Cal. 587, 596 114:1 P. 7G7]). tIll' <ltlmillistrative diffkulti,'s 
of effective regulation WllCll the byo parts an' so dos(']y intet'-
related as the pro<iuetioll 01' oil all,l gas are appar(,llt. 'Where-
as a producer's ullequivo"al dl'lli('atioll of part of its propcrty 
to a publie use affonls a hasis for :;egr('gating' its regulatell 
from its unregulated adivity, if that settled stallilard were 
now to be abandoned, some otht'r method would have to be 
developed for segregating oil and gas operations for purposes 
of regulation. 
[7] Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
requirement of dedication has been of some value in obviating 
regulation of lllany slllall producers whose activities fall with-
in the literal definitions of the act but are too restricted to 
merit publie conccrn. Although it Illay be true that this re-
quirement has also permittell large producers to escape regu-
lation that might ue wise, nevertheless, existing law pro-
vides no alternative to dedication for selecting those to be 
regulated. Abolition of one standard to determine ,yho 
should be regulated would compel choice of another. 
It also bears emphasis that many of the major oil and gas 
produeers in this state, including Richfield, are foreign cor-
porations that cannot lawfully transact public utility business 
in this state. (Pub. Util. Code, § 704.) [8] Of conrse, a 
foreign corporation cannot escape public utility regulation 
or evade public utility obligations on the ground that it'> 
activities are illegal. (See Webster Mfg. Co. v. Byrnes, 207 
Cal. 630, 640 [280 P. 101] ; Babcock v. Don Lugo Corp., 40 
C.R.C. 699, 701.) 'Ve cannot reasonably assnme, however, 
that in repeatedly reenacting the relevant definitions of pnbli,~ 
utilities the Legislature rejeeted the requirement of dedication 
as an implicit limitation on those definitions, for had it donc 
so, it would have rendrred unlawful by implication alone a 
substantial part of the deYClopnH'llt of the oil and gas industry 
in this state. 
[9] Finally, cven if puhlie utility regulation were ex-
tended to all oil and gas prod1V~ers who fall within the literal 
langnage of the aet, produ{'crs who used their gas tlwl11selv('s 
or sold it to others to manufacture into ehrmital product,; 
or to use for other purposcs not sprr·ified in tl1l' act wOII]ll 
('sl·ape regulation. Regulationdepelll\('llt on how the prol]n"PI' 
) 
) 
July]%OI jlICIIFlELD Oil, ('ClIO'. /'.1'1'111,1(' l·TIL. COM. 433 
1;)4 C.2d 4W; t) Cal.Rptr. !1-!8. 354 P.2d 41 
disposl'll of his gas mi~ht stimulate h's~ ucsirable unregulateu 
uses at the "Xlw11se of IlIOl'l' dcsimble regulated uses. 
[10] The prodm'l'r's freeuom u'llder existing law to deter-
mine how his gas shall be disposed of so long as he does not 
llc(li('ate his property to public usc has not resulted in suffi-
cient misuse of gas or sufficicntly wasteful marketing prae-
t ie('s to induce the L('gi~lature to dlange it, The Legislature 
is uniquely able to amass ceonomic data and hold hearillg~ 
wl1('rc it ('an give heed to III all." representatives of the public 
beside'S parties to a eontroYel';;Y, It can best determine whether 
tlll'rc should be furth,'r rrg'ulation of the oil and gas industry, 
and if so, the form it shouhl take. 
Southern Counties contends, however, that even if Rich-
field is not subject to regulation as a public utility gas corpo-
ration, it was neverthelcss required to secure a certificate of 
public eonYenienee and necessity to constru<'t a pipeline from 
its Cuyama Valley and San Joaquin Valll'Y fidd;; to supply 
gas to Edison. It rrlies on the provision of Public Utilities 
Code, section 1001, that ":\0 railroad corporation whose rail-
road is operated primarily by electric energy, street railroad 
corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telegraph 
corporation, telephone corporation, or water corporation shall 
begin the construction of a street railroad, or of a line, plant, 
or system, or any extension thereof, without having first ob-
tained from the commission a certificate that the present or 
future public convenience and necessity require or will require 
such construction." (Italies added.) It points out that this 
requirement is 110t expressly limited to public utility gas 
corporations, and since regulation of competition between 
public and non public utilities is cognate and germane to the 
regulation of public utilities, it contends that the Legislature 
constitutionally vested the commission with certification juris-
diction over all gas corporations defined in sections 221 and 
222. (Sce Morel v. Railroa.d Commission, 11 Ca1.2d 488, 496 
[81 P.2d 144].) 
[11] In the past, however, the commission has inter-
pretru section 1001 as applicable only to public utilities, as is 
illustratl'd by its failure to s\lbjed the oil and g-as industry to 
certification jurisdidion. (S"<' also People v. Orange Coullty 
Farmcrs & M. Assn .. 56 ('al.App, 205, 210 [204 P. 873J; 
Baldwin Pal'k Domestic lFalrr Co. v. Union 'i'J'1I8t alld Savings 
Ba.llk. I) C.Re. 685, 686.) '\~e a(!I'r(' with this interpretation, 
for whcn the laJJg"uag(' of sedioll 1001 rPlied upon by Southerll 
Count irs is l"ra(l in contrxt it is clear that the naming of 
) 
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spe\;illc t~'prs o[ (,Ol'purat iOllS \\'1'18 illtrnded, not to extend the 
certification requirement to other tltall Jlublie utilities, but to 
specify the public utilitil'8 that mu~t s('cure certificates. Thus, 
the second paragraph of section 10013 deals with disputes 
between public utilitirs, section 1002" requires certification 
of "a public utility of a dass specified in Section 1001" to 
exerl'ise "any right or priyilrge untler allY franchise or pcrmit 
hcreaft('r granted ... " and section 100(P providcs for enforce-
ment of section 1001 by cease and tlesist order only against 
"a public utility of the class specified in Section 1001." It is 
also sigllifil'ant that when thc Legislature has undertaken to 
give thc commission jurisdiction to regulate llonpublic utility 
businesses whose regulation is cognate and germane to the 
regulation of public utilities, it has ordinarily done so by 
adopting specific legislation dealing with such nonpublic 
utility businesses, such as the Highway Carriers' Act (Pub. 
Util. Code, § 3;:501 et s('q.) now codified in division 2 of the 
Public Utilities Code. (Hegulatioll of Related Businesses by 
the Public Utilitirs Commission.) 
[12] Had the Legislature wisheu. to r\'gulate competition 
." This article shall not be construed to require any such corporation 
to secure such certificate for nn extension ,~ithin any city or city and 
county within which it has theretofore lawfully commenced operations, 
or for an extension into territory either within or without a city or 
city and county contiguous to its ~treet railroad. or Iinc. plant, or system, 
Hnd not theretofore served Ly a puhlic utility of Iikt> character, or for an 
extension within or to territory already servcd by it, nece"s:uy in t.he 
ordinary course of its business. If any puhlic utility, in constructing or 
extending its line, p;:mt. or system, interferes or is about to intcrfcr(' 
with the operation of the line, plant, or system of :lny other puhli,~ 
utility, already constructed, thc commission, on complaint of thc public 
utility claiming to he illjnriously affected. !JISY, after hearing, makc such 
order and prescribe such terms and conditions for the location of the 
Jines, plants, or systems affected as to it may seem just and rcasonable. 
"'No public utility of a class specified in Section 1001 shall hence· 
forth exercise any right or privilege under any franchise' or permit here· 
after grantcd, or under any franchise or permit heretofore granted hut 
not herctofore actually cxerrised, or the exercise of which has been sus-
pended for more than one year. without fil'gt hil\'ing obtained from the 
commission a certificate that puhlic convenience and necessity require t.he 
excrcise of such right or pri"ilq::e. This section shall not validate any 
right or privilege now invalid or hereafter hecoming invalid under any 
law of this State." 
'''When a complnint has been filed ",ith the commission alleging that 
a puhlic utility of the class specified in Section 1001 is engaged or is 
about to engag(J in construction work without hrn-ing secured from the 
commission a certificate of pulllic f'om'cnienee and nC'('cssity as requirl'd 
by this article, the commission may, with or without notice. make its 
order requiring t.he public utility coml'lained of to cease and ,lesist from 
such eonstruct.ion until the commission makes and files its decision on the 
(.'omplaint or until the further order of the COllllllission." 
) 
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between public utility and llonpublic utility gas eOl'porations 
by re(juiring certificates of publie eOllvcnielll:C and necessity, it 
is reasonable to assume that it would have (lone so by requiving 
nonpuhlie utility gas cOl'porations to se(:ul'C eertificail's to pro-
vide srrviee, not merely to build plants or extensions thereof. 
Regulation of plant eonstruction and extcnsion is a meaning-
ful adjunct to overall public utility regulation, but as applicd 
to otherwise unregulated non public utility gas eorporatiolls, 
it would serve haphazardly at best to protect public utility 
gas corporations from unde.3irablc competition. Thus, unle;;s 
an oil and gas producer had dedicated its propcrty to a public 
usc and was therefore subject to regulation as a public utility, 
it would be free after its plant was construeted or extended, 
to withdraw it from the use approved by the eonunissioll and 
to use it to compete with regulated utilities. It could do the 
same thing with a plant originally constructed to provide gas 
for other than light, heat, or power, to which section 1001, 
however interpreted, would 110t apply. On tll.., other hand, any 
nonpublic utility oil and gas producer that was selling any 
of its gas for light, heat, or power would be required, within 
the limitations set forth in section 1001, to secure commission 
approval to drill new wells or otherwise extend its facilitiei-l. 
To reinterpret section 1001 to require such approval would 
not only create many of the samc problems that would flow 
from reinterpreting the definitions of public utilities, but 
would do so without providing the overall public utility regu-
lation necessary to make thc certification requirement of 
section 1001 meaningful. 
The question remains whethcr the commission's orders can 
be sustained on the ground that Richfield is a public utility 
that has dedicated its property to a public use. The com-
mission found that Richfield" in rcspect to its gas operations, 
is a public utility gas corporation subject to the jurisdiction 
of this Commission (1) '"hich has dedicated gas reserves in 
this State over and above the requirements of gas for its own 
usc and gas facilities in this State to the public and (2) which 
has performed and is performing' senice and has delivered 
and is delivering gas to private corpOi'atiolls which in turn 
either directly or indirectly, mpdiately or immediately, per-
form such service and deliver such gas to the public." 
In considering the question of dcdication it is essential to 
bear in mind that even under the commission's view, only 
part of Richfield's property has been dcdil·ated to public use. 
[13] Although RichfieJ(1 ('0111(1 llot wi1 htlraw property fro III 
--) 
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a use to whieh it had h('I~1I lll'dieall'd wiihout thc \'Olllllli::;/Sioll'" 
\'OI1S(,lIt Ot· ('senpe rl')!ulatioll hy l~onvl'rtillg all or a part of II 
public utility sl'l'vie(' into a Ilonpuhlic utility sl'l'yil.'e (lV esterll 
Canal Co. v. Rajlrond CommissiuJI, 216 Cal. 639, 647 [15 P.2d 
853] ; Van IIoosear V. Raill'oad Commission, 184 Cal. 553, 557 
[194 P. 1003J), Hichfield remains free to use pl'operty it hit:; 
not dedicated to public usc as it sees fit so long as it does 1Iot 
dedicate such property or prejudice any public utility oblil!a-
tions it may havc assumcd. (Lamb v. Oalifornia Water &; Tel. 
00.,21 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [129 P.2d 371] ; Mound lV. 00. v. South-
ern Oalif. Edison 00., 184 Cal. 602, 610 [194 P. 1014] ; Marin 
Water etc. 00. v. Town of Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 596 [143 
P. 767].) Thus, eyen if the evidence would support a fil1dill~ 
that Richfield had dedicated some of its gas reserves anJ 
facilities to public use, we must anuul the commission's orders 
if they seek to regulate or prollibit Richfield's llonpublic utility 
operations. 
To support its finding that Richfield has dedicated its gas 
reserves over and aiJove its OW11 requirements, the commission 
relies on Richfield's disposition of its surplus gas and the 
testimony of Travers, Richfield's vice president. Richfield 
made two small sales of gas in the Sacramento Valley to the 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a public utility gas and 
electrical cOl'poration, without restriction as to the use to be _ 
made thereof. It has agreed to sell to Edison 500 billion cubie 
feet of gas at specified daily rates of delivery within the next I 
25 years. In April, 1955, it entered into a five-year contraet 
with Pacific Lighting Gas Supply Company for the exchange 
of gas between its oil and gas fields and the sale of gas to 
Pacific Lighting. Pacific Lighting is a public utility gas cor-
poration that purchases gas from producers and resells it to its 
affiliates, including Southern Counties, who sell gas to the 
general public. 
The Pacific Lighting contract defined certain of Richfield's 
fields as basic gas fields and the gas therefrom as basic gas. 
Richfield could add new fields to the basic gas fields or with-
draw any basic gas field from the operation of the contract 
if it connected such field with its own pipeline facilities. Cer-
tain other fields of Richfield were defined as emergency fields 
and the gas therefrom as emergency gas. Richfield eould 
deliver basic gas not needed for production or injection ill 
the basic gas fields to Pacific Lighting, and Pacific Li~hting" 
agreed to the extent of its ability to accept such gas not to 
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amount of gas to Richfield at other points in its pipeline 
\System. Pacific Lighting could curtail the exchange of basic 
gas in the winter and make up the deficiency before the follow-
ing winter. Richfield agreed to pay specified fees for exchange 
service. Pacific Lighting could elect to purchase elllergency 
gas during the winter in amounts previously specified but not 
to exceed the amounts it exchanged for Richfield the previous 
year. Richfield could offer basic gas for sale instead of ex-
change, but it did 110t do so. It could also offer emergency gas 
not requested by Pacific Lighting for sale or exchange in the 
event of temporary plant shutdowns or other temporary 
emergency conditions. Pacific Lighting exercised its option 
to buy emergency gas during the winters of 1955-1956 and 
1957-1958. 
Travers testified that the first call on Richfield's gas was for 
pressure maintenance in its oil fields, and that for many years 
it had refrained from making any long-term contracts for the 
sale of gas on a day-to-day basis. Richfield sells gas to the gas 
utilities, however, to meet the peak needs of their firm cus-
tomers and it "felt that the company should not and could 
not refuse to make its facilities and its reserves available" 
for that purpose. In the last year or two Richfield added sub-
stantially to its reserves and reached a point where it was 
willing to sell a limited amount of gas on a day-to-day basis. 
Edison offered a better price than either of the large gas 
utilities, so Richfield accepted Edison's offer. Richfield has 
refused to sell gas to industrial users, and it has no plans to 
sell gas except to Edison and to the gas utilities for peaking 
purposes. Before Richfield executed its present contract with 
Edison, an attempt was made to settle its controversy with 
Southern Counties over its proposed sale of gas to Edison by 
negotiating a contract whereby Richficld would supply gas to 
Edison through arrangements with Pacific Lighting and South-
ern Counties. The negotiations proved abortive. In discussing 
them, Travers testified that he objected to a proposed clause 
that would have permitted Pacific Lighting to purchase gas 
from Richfield. "Now, I let that go in, into the final draft 
but was advised by someone else the last day before we con-
sidered signing it that that might constitute a dedication of 
our rcserves at that point to Pacific IJighting Corporation 
which, as I stated earlier, we have lIcver done and do not 
propose to do except for peaking purposes." Travers also 
testified that Richfield wantcd to sell gas at a faster rate than 
that provided in the Edison contract, and that "'Ve think 
) 
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that the second highest use for our gas in California is to 
meet the peak requirements of the utility companies and we 
are still in business, we are still prepared to render that sort 
of service." He further stated, "Now, you realize that gas for i 
peaking purposes normally does not involve large volumes 
but it does involve very high rates, so we feel that we can 
maintain an exception of peaking gas from the general state-
ment that we have solll all the gas to Edison Company that 
we wish to sell at this moment." 
Richfield contends that it has not dedicated its gas reserves 
to public use by holding itself out as willing to sell gas to 
the public or ally portion thereof; that it has only sold gas 
to selected corporations pursuant to negotiated contracts. (See 
California lV atcr &7 l'd. Co. v. Public Util. Com., 51 Ca1.2d 
478,494 [334P.2d 887] ; CommLl'cial Communications v. Pu.b-
lic Util. Com., ~o Cal.~d 512, 52:J [327 P.2d 513] ; Souza v. 
Public Utilities Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 540, 542-543 [233 P.2d 
537] ; Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Ca1.2d 722, 732-
733 [227 P.2d 256J ; S. Edward.s Associ<rtcs v. Railroad Com., 
196 Cal. 62, 70 [235 P. 647}.) It asserts that Travers' refer-
ence to dedication of gas reserves for peaking purposes is 
merely descriptive of its contract with Pacific Lighting, and 
contends that the terms of that contract negative any infer-
ence of dedication. Thus it points out that Pacific Lighting 
could purchase gas only in limited amounts, from a limited 
area, for a limitell time, and upon limited terms, and that 
Richfield reserved the right to withdraw any of its basic 
fields from the operation of the contract and could defeat 
Pacific Lighting's option to purchase gas by failing to tendcr 
gas for exchange. Since llichfield, like the other oil and ga~ 
producers, can engage in the business of sclling gas without 
dedicating its property to public usC', it contends that Travers' 
testimony that "we arc still in businC'ss, we a're still prepared 
to render" peaking service is consistent with its not having 
dedicated its gas reserves. )IorcoYer, since Richfield is a 
Delaware corporation that callnot lC'gally operate as a publie 
utility in California, it contends that Travers' testimony that 
Richfield felt that it "shoulll not and could not refuse to make 
its facilities and its rcservl'S ayailable" for peaking purposes 
should not be interpretcd as evidence of a willin~ness to enter 
into an unlawful business, but only as evidence of a willingness 
to fulfill emergency public needs by providing emergency 
service on a sell'ctive basis. Finally, it contends that peaking 
sCITice involves such uncertain qnantitiesof gas that its 
) 
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very natll\',' is ill\'oll,.,i"t('nt. "'illl an unequivocal and il'1'~vocable 
dedication of P\'olH'l'ty to public u~e, 
[14] Rl'solut ion of any ('onfiicting inferences that might 
be drawn from Tmn'l's' testimony was for the commission, 
however, and had it found that Richfield had dedicated its 
. gas reserves for peaking pUl'poses to the extent it had supplied 
such service ill the past, we are 110t prepared to say that its 
finding would be Ullsupporteu. \Ve leave that question open, 
for the ('ommission did not limit its assertion of jurisdiction 
to Riehfield's peaking services. It asserted jurisdiction over 
all of Hichfielcl's gas reserves and facilities not needed for 
Richfield's own use. [15] Hichfield's service to Edison, 
howevcr, is a new service supported by additional recently-
acquired reserves that Richfield has not dedicated to peaking 
services, and it did not dcdic·ate such reserves by agreeing to 
sell gas to Edison, for that salc was made to a selected cus-
tomer and like service was denied to others. 
Southern Counties and the commission contend, however, 
that Richfield has dedicated the pipeline through which it 
supplies Edison to public use and that therefore at least in 
its use of that line it is a public utility gas corporation subject 
to rt'gulation as such. They base this contention on the com-
mon-carrier condition in Richfield's permit to build part of its 
pipeline across the Los Padres National Forest. Condition 18 
of Richfield's permit provides that "The applicant agrees 
to operate the pipeline during the period of this permit as a 
common carrier to the extent required as to rights-of-way by 
the provisions of tIle Mineral Leasing Act, and, within 30 
days after request of the Secretary of the Interior, or his 
delegate, as to rights-of-way, to file rate schedule and tariff 
for thc transportation of oil or gas, as the case may be, as such 
common carrier with any regulatory agency having juris-
diction over such transportation, as the Secretary or his dele-
gate may prescribe." The Mineral Leasing Act provides that 
"nights-of-way through the public lands, including the forest 
reservcs of the Unitcd Slates, may be granted by the Secretary 
of the Intel'ior for piprline purposes for the transportation 
of oil or natural gas ... under sUl'h rl'gulations and conditions 
as to survey, IO('ation, appli('atioll, and use as may be prescribeu 
by the Secretary of the Interior allli upon the express cOllditiOlI 
that sHeh pipdincs shan be constmetcd, operated, and main-
taiJ)cd as eOJnmon cal'l'if'l's ~1Il(1 shall accept, convey, transport, 
or purchase without discrimination, oil or natural gas pro-
) 
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,hll'C"il 1'1'0111 OOYI'I'lllllC"nt lanas in tlIP "i"illitr of the pipf'line 
in f;lH'h pl'oport ionatc alllollllts as t hc SI'l'l'etal'Y or the I ntl'riOl' 
may, at'tC"I' a fllJlIll'al'ill~ with dllC" notice thC"I'po[ to the intrr-
ested parties and a prolwr findilll! of facts, detprmine to he 
rcasonahle: j'l'vvidcd. That the ,'Ollllllon carrier provisions of 
this section shall not appl~' to any natllral gas pipeline opera-
ted hy any person subjl'd to regulation unuer the Natural 
Gas Aet or hy any public utility sUhject to lIoelll regulation] : 
, , , Failure to comply with the provisions of this section 01' 
the regulations and conditions prescrihed hy the Secretary or 
the Interior shall be ground for forfeiture of the grant hy the 
United States district court for the district in which the 
property, or some part thereof, is located in an appropriate 
proceeding," (30 U,S.C. § 185.) 
Richfield contends that thc commoll-l'arrier condition im-
poses only the limited obligations of common-law common 
carriage amI can be enfol'l'ed only by forfeiture and that there-
fore acceptance of a permit sllbjcct to that con(lition does 110t 
constitutc dedication of a pipeline to public use within the 
meaning of California law. In this respect it points out that 
the terms of the federal act itself contemplate the granting 
of rights-of-way to both public utility and nonpublic utility 
applicants. 
Richfield also eontends thnt. sinee common earriers of gas 
were covered by the now-repealed provisions of the petrolellm 
pipeline statutes of 1913 (Stats. 1913, ch. 286, p. 532; ch, 327, 
p. 657), they were excluded by implieation from the definition 
of gas corporations. (Pub. rtil. Code, §§ 221-222.) Moreover. 
it asserts that the same implied exelusion would result if a 
common carrier of gas is a pipelinp. corporation under existing 
law as a common carrier of "crude oil or other fluid substancE's 
except water through pipe lines." (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 227-
228.) It contends, therefore, that its acceptance of a permit 
subject to the comInon-earriE'r condition would at most justif.\" 
a finding that it is a pipeline corporation. Moreo"E'r. sincl' 
pipeline corporations are IIOt subject to the certifil'ation pro-
visions of sections 1001 and 1002, it coneludes that the com-
mission's eease and df'sist order t'annot stand. 
[16] We are not pel'suntlrd that a corporation that owlls 
property for the "transmission ... of ~as" (Pub. lTtil. COllI:', 
§ 221) as a eommon rarriE'r is not a gas corporation within 
the meaning of sectiolls 221 and 222 because it was OIJ('e also 
defined as a pipeline eOl'poration or is arguably so dcfil1l:'d 
today on the theory that gas is a "fluid" snhstanee within tIll' 
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meaning of section 227. Moreover, despite the differences be-
twccn the obligations imposed by the common-carrier conlli-
tion of the federal act and thosc imposed on public utilities 
by the California act, we believe that the holding out to senc 
the public implicit in common carriage is at least substantial 
evident'c that would support a finding that a federal permittee 
had dedicated its pipeline to public use for thc common car-
riage of gas. 
Richfield, howcver, does not seek to use its pipeline for the 
common carriage of gas and it may never be called upon to 
do so. It wishes to use its pipeline solely to transport its own 
gas in the course of its non public utility activities, and at 
most it has evidenced a willingness to operate its pipeline as 
a COIllmon carrier when and if it is called upon to do so. 
[17] The Public l"tilitics Act is not concerned with Rich-
field's purely non public utility activities (see California Watcr 
& Tcl. Co. v. Public Util. Com., 51 Ca1.2d 478, 488 [334 P.2tl 
887], and dissenting opinion at p. 509; Commercial Cornrnwni-
cations v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2cl 512, 518 [327 P.2d 
513] ), and its certification provisions may not therefore be 
invoked to prohibit the construction and use of facilities for 
such nonpublic utility activities merely because Richfield may 
in the indefinite future wish or be called upon to make such 
facilities available for public use. When and if Richfield 
wishes or is called upon to make its pipeline available for the 
common carriage of gas, it may then be determined whether 
its private use must be curtailed to avoid conflict with any 
obligation to the public it assumed in accepting a federal 
permit subject to the common-carrier condition. (Sce Com-
mercial Communications v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2d 512, 
518 [327 P.2d 513].) 
The orders are annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComh, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
The petitions of Respondent and of the Real Party in In-
terest for a rehearing were denied July 27, 1960. 
